



The Birth of Corporate Governance 
Harwell Wells† 
INTRODUCTION 
When did our modern debates over corporate governance begin?  
The traditional view dates them to 1932 with the publication of Adolf A. 
Berle and Gardiner Means’s The Modern Corporation and Private Prop-
erty, a work that delineated the separation of ownership and control in 
the modern corporation and the problems that separation caused.1  The 
Modern Corporation is said to be the “ur-text of modern corporate go-
vernance,”2 to have “began the modern debate on corporate gover-
nance,”3 to have first identified the “fundamental problem in U.S. corpo-
rate governance,”4 to be the first work to have “described corporate go-
vernance as a problematic separation of ownership and control,”5 and 
even, in one contrarian take, to be the work that “got the corporate go-
vernance literature off on the wrong foot.”6  Careful students will occa-
sionally acknowledge that there were predecessors to Berle and Means 
and that the idea of the separation of ownership and control was in the air 
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before The Modern Corporation and Private Property.7  But the broader 
message is clear: whatever came before, corporate governance really 
began with Berle and Means.8 
This Article will show that this story is wrong.  It is wrong not be-
cause Berle and Means were not path-breaking and innovative (they 
were), nor because they did not develop an enduring framework for cor-
porate legal scholarship (they did).  The story is wrong because of what it 
leaves out.  The Modern Corporation and Private Property was not a 
radical break from earlier thought but the end product of several decades 
in which economists, lawyers, and journalists tried to understand both the 
governance problems of the new modern corporations and what impact 
those corporate governance problems had on the nation’s public.  The 
separation of ownership and control, together with dispersed sharehold-
ing, two closely related but not identical concepts, had been identified as 
a new development for the American corporation shortly after the turn of 
the twentieth century—well before Berle and Means—but those devel-
opments’ import was not at all clear. Thus, economists and legal scholars 
of that earlier era argued over what exactly was meant by the separation 
of ownership and control, what groups it would most sharply impact, and 
even whether it was a problem at all. 
By the 1920s these ideas took on a more familiar cast, as several 
writers identified the separation of ownership and control and widely 
dispersed share ownership as developments that raised grave problems 
                                                            
 7. See, e.g., Lipartito & Morii, 33 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1025 (2010) (discussing Ripley as a 
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for the management of corporations.  These writers also identified share-
holder protection as the central goal for corporation law.  It was during 
this decade that corporate governance became a major topic for public 
debate, as newspaper articles, magazine accounts, and popular books 
appeared.  These publications attacked corporate management, asserted 
that management was benefitting itself at shareholders’ expense, and 
pointed to the separation of ownership and control as the ultimate culprit.  
By seeing Berle and Means’s work as a product and a beneficiary of 
these debates, we can better understand the genuine innovations it made 
and why it was so quickly accepted as a classic. 
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I briefly examines the con-
cept of “corporate governance” and argues for dating the concept’s ori-
gins to the debates of the 1920s.  Part II then moves on to examine early 
scholarly and popular discussions of the separation of ownership and 
control.  After surveying the historical developments that produced the 
recognizably modern corporate economy around the turn of the century, 
it examines early scholarly and popular discussions of the separation of 
ownership and control, focusing on three major thinkers, Louis D. Bran-
deis, Walter Lippmann, and Thorstein Veblen.  It argues that, while each 
of these authors examined the separation of ownership and control, they 
did not agree on its contours or impact.  They did not necessarily see the 
separation of ownership and control as a problem for shareholders, and 
some did not see it as a problem at all.  To portray these authors simply 
as anticipators of Berle and Means is to misunderstand the arguments 
they actually made and to miss the ways in which ideas about the separa-
tion of ownership and control were slowly developed. 
Part III, the heart of this Article, focuses on Berle and Means’s 
most significant predecessor in the debates over corporate governance, 
William Z. Ripley, and his 1920s crusade for better corporate gover-
nance, culminating in his book Main Street and Wall Street.9  It discusses 
how Ripley, already one of the best-known economists of his day, 
launched a campaign in 1925 against financial and legal innovations that 
were, he claimed, allowing corporate managers to wrest control of corpo-
rations away from their owners—shareholders scattered across the coun-
try.  In speeches and a series of articles in the Atlantic magazine, Ripley 
hammered corporate leaders and pushed for a range of reforms in corpo-
rate law and governance intended to provide new protections for share-
holders.  His campaign drew wide attention and gained notice from Wall 
Street and the President of the United States.  Ripley was not alone dur-
ing the 1920s; his work is only the best-remembered of a series of scho-
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larly and popular works that turned a spotlight on the separation of own-
ership and control and the spread of shareholding.  Thus, it was during 
the 1920s that recognizably modern views of the separation of ownership 
and control, and its consequences, took form. 
Finally, in Part IV, the Article turns to Berle and Means.  It dis-
cusses both their connections to earlier theorists and crusaders, and the 
ways in which they transcended their predecessors.  The Modern Corpo-
ration and Private Property broke with its predecessors by providing a 
technically sophisticated and empirically based legal and economic anal-
ysis of the separation of ownership and control, and by setting that analy-
sis within a narrative describing how the modern corporation had come 
to dominate American economy and society. 
In discussing the history of corporate governance before Berle and 
Means, I intend to do three things.  First, I seek to develop a new account 
of the origins of modern debates over corporate governance.  As told 
now, the story usually begins with The Modern Corporation and Private 
Property, with the economic development of large corporations provided 
as background, and perhaps a footnote acknowledging some intellectual 
precursors.  As an historical account, this story misses or downplays 
writers who grappled with the separation of ownership and control before 
Berle and Means and who saw that separation in very different lights 
than did Berle and Means.  It was not inevitable that the problem of 
ownership and control would take the form it eventually did, with share-
holder protection and managerial power as its main foci; however, we 
cannot recognize its contingent nature until we reach back to see alterna-
tive paths not taken. 
Second, I wish to emphasize an element sometimes overlooked, 
then and now, in debates over corporate governance: their popular as-
pect.10  In the 1920s, corporate governance became a matter of concern 
to the general public, one that drew in not only economists or law profes-
sors but also ordinary Americans who were introduced to and then an-
gered by the separation of ownership and control. 
Third, I hope to shed new light on why The Modern Corporation 
and Private Property won such immediate acclaim.  Why were Berle and 
Means so quickly hailed as prophets?  Much of the answer lies in the fact 
they built on ideas already in circulation and spoke to a public already 
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primed to hear their views.  This is not to disparage Berle and Means’s 
very real accomplishments, which were many; they both synthesized and 
transformed what had gone before.  But we can best understand their ge-
nuine innovations by also understanding the achievements of their prede-
cessors. 
The historical aim of this Article, then, is not merely to find out 
who said “separation of ownership and control” first, 11 for tracing out an 
intellectual antecedent wouldn’t tell us why the idea succeeded.  This 
Article instead aims to explain why and when the idea took shape, flou-
rished, and spread. 
I.  CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: WHERE TO BEGIN? 
Asserting that corporate governance’s origins lie early in the twen-
tieth century, before Berle and Means, raises the question: what do we 
mean by corporate governance?  In one form or another, “corporate go-
vernance” has always been with us, at least as long as the corporate form 
has allowed for conflicts between investors and managers.  Early in the 
seventeenth century, for example, conflicts between directors and share-
holders marked the Dutch East India Company.12  In The Wealth of Na-
tions, Adam Smith identified divergent interest between managers and 
owners as an, in his eyes, insuperable dilemma for the efficient operation 
of the corporation.  Directors, he wrote, “being the managers of other 
people’s money rather than their own,” would never watch over this 
money with the “same anxious vigilance with which the partners in a 
private copartnery frequently watch over their own.”  Thus, Smith ar-
gued, “[n]egligence and profusion . . . must always prevail . . . in the 
management of such a company.”13  In the mid-nineteenth century, cor-
porate governance in the U.S. shifted with changes in shareholder voting 
rights as democratic, weighted-voting systems, which gave small share-
holders significant power, were replaced by a “plutocratic” system of 
one-share, one vote, favoring those with the most shares.14  Each of these 
examples was surely an episode in the history of corporate governance.15 
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As it is used by corporate law scholars today, however, “corporate 
governance” has a more specialized connotation.16  At its broadest, the 
term can cover all the rules of and constraints on corporate decision-
making.17  More often, however, its use is tied to the need to constrain 
managers to act in shareholders’ best interests, at least in the public cor-
poration.  In other words, corporate governance is a response to the 
agency problems created by the separation of ownership and control, 
namely the powerless shareholders and the autonomous management.  
This is nicely captured in a definition of the term offered by Hillary Sale: 
The term “corporate governance” is widely used to refer to the 
balance of power between officers, directors, and shareholders. 
Academics often discuss it in the context of regulating commu-
nications and combating agency costs where corporate officers 
and directors have the power to control the company, but the 
owners are diverse and largely inactive shareholders.  Good cor-
porate governance, then, allows for a balance between what of-
ficers and directors do and what shareholders desire. The term 
implies that managers have the proper incentives to work on be-
half of shareholders and that shareholders are properly informed 
about the activities of managers.18 
While other scholars have offered variants of this definition, essen-
tial to almost all definitions is the need for mechanisms to minimize 
problems created by the separation of ownership and control.  That is, in 
a world of dispersed and “largely inactive” shareholders, corporate go-
vernance asks what legal, economic, and social mechanisms can best 
compel their agents, the corporation’s managers, not only to run the cor-
poration well but also to run it for the benefit of shareholders and not 
themselves.19  As one commentator put it, the separation of ownership 
                                                            
 16. The term itself appears to have become popular only in the 1980s and was used to describe 
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 18. Hillary Sale, Delaware’s Good Faith, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 456, 460 (2004). 
 19. See, e.g., JONATHAN MACEY, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: PROMISES KEPT, PROMISES 
BROKEN vii (2008) (discussing corporate governance as “farrago of legal and economic devices that 
induce the people in charge of companies with publicly owned and traded stock to keep the promises 
2010] The Birth of Corporate Governance 1253 
and control is “the central problem of corporate governance.”20  It is to 
the separation of ownership and control—how it arose, how it was first 
understood, and how it came to be seen as a problem—that we now turn. 
II.  SEPARATIONS 
In the early decades of the twentieth century, observers were united 
in recognizing that there were major transformations underway in the 
corporate economy, that these changes would also have far-reaching so-
cial and political effects, and that the changes included a separation of 
ownership from control.  They did not, however, agree on what these 
changes were or what they meant. 
A.  Historical Antecedents 
The business and economic developments that would give rise to 
the modern corporation and to modern corporate governance are well 
understood and deserve only a brief recap.  The nineteenth century saw 
the growth of giant, complex industrial enterprises in several industries, 
starting with the railroads.21  At the turn of the twentieth century, large-
scale business organization came to the manufacturing sector as industry-
wide mergers attempted to unite many comparatively small firms into 
“single giant enterprise[s]” that dominated their respective industries.22  
Although not all industrial combinations succeeded, those that did suc-
ceeded spectacularly.  By the mid-1910s, a few giant “center firms” 
dominated many sectors of the American economy and maintained their 
preeminence for decades.23  These firms’ growth generated a popular 
                                                                                                                                     
they make to investors”); Merritt B. Fox & Michael A. Heller, Corporate Governance Lessons from 
Russian Enterprise Fiascoes, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1720, 1722 (2000) (“Firms exhibit good corporate 
governance when they both maximize the firm’s residuals—the wealth generated by real operations 
of the firm—and, in the case of investor-owned firms, distribute the wealth so generated to share-
holders in a pro rata fashion.”).  Some scholars, it should be noted, argue against a narrow focus 
solely on shareholder benefit.  See PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW (Lawrence Mitchell ed., 1995). 
 20. STEPHEN BAINBRIDGE, THE NEW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 5 
(2008). 
 21. The standard account of the growth of large-scale enterprise in the United States remains 
ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN 
BUSINESS (1977), which of course gives a far more complex account than the brief summary pre-
sented above.  It should now be read in conjunction with later critiques.  See, e.g., Naomi R. Lamo-
reaux, Daniel M.G. Raff & Peter Temin, Beyond Markets and Hierarchies: Toward a New Synthesis 
of American Business History, 108 AM. HIST. REV. 404, 428–35 (2003). 
 22. NAOMI LAMOREAUX, THE GREAT MERGER MOVEMENT IN AMERICAN BUSINESS, 1895–
1904 1 (1985).  Not all the merged firms succeeded, but many did and they dominated their respec-
tive industries for much of the twentieth century.  See CHANDLER, supra note 21, at 340–44. 
 23. Center firms succeeded in industries where a capital-intensive, technologically advanced 
firm would enjoy significant economies of scale, scope, or both.  THOMAS MCCRAW, PROPHETS OF 
REGULATION 68–79 (1984) [hereinafter PROPHETS].  Informal or formal attempts at combination 
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backlash; critics ranged from farmers baffled and angered by high rail-
road rates to small retailers pressed by giant competitors.  Distinctions 
between various kinds of combinations and their various ill effects were 
often lost in public discourse, as a generalized hostility to large business 
enterprises arose under the misleading heading of the “trust problem.”24 
Another development ran alongside the growth of large corpora-
tions and the hostility to them: the broadening market for their securities 
and a growing number of shareholders.25  When the turn-of-the-century 
mergers produced new giant corporations, they also produced many indi-
viduals, specifically the former owners of the small firms that combined 
in the merger, who needed to be paid for their ownership interests.26  
These individuals received securities, preferred and common stock, 
which they often sold, giving rise to a market for industrial securities.  
For the first time, a significant number of comparatively “small” inves-
tors were drawn into securities ownership.27  Although exact ownership 
is extremely difficult to estimate before the 1920s, one study showed that 
the three largest American corporations at least tripled their number of 
book stockholders between 1900 and 1917.28  Further, the popular press 
increased its attention given to the phenomenon of stock ownership by 
                                                                                                                                     
failed in industries that did not have such features and where entry by new competitors was easy.  
See id. 
 24. See MAURY KLEIN, THE GENESIS OF INDUSTRIAL AMERICA 1870–1920 127 (Donald Crit-
chlow ed., 2007) (“By 1890 alarmed critics were plastering the ‘trust’ label on every giant enterprise 
and flinging it about as a loose synonym for monopoly and big business in general.”); MCCRAW, 
PROPHETS, supra note 23, at 57–79. 
 25. See generally Julia Cathleen Ott, When Wall Street Met Main Street: The Quest for an 
Investors’ Democracy and the Emergence of the Retail Investor in the United States, 1890–1930, 9 
ENTER. & SOC’Y 619 (2008) [hereinafter When Wall Street]; LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL, THE 
SPECULATION ECONOMY: HOW FINANCE TRIUMPHED OVER INDUSTRY 103–05, 200–04 (2007) [he-
reinafter SPECULATION ECONOMY]. 
 26. See Thomas R. Navin & Marian V. Sears, The Rise in a Market for Industrial Securities 
1887–1902, 29 BUS. HIST. REV. 105, 137 (1955).  Although Navin and Sears’s account focuses on 
industrial securities, other evidence suggests that railroad securities were also not widely held before 
1900.  Of the largest U.S. railroads in 1900, only two had more than 10,000 book stockholders, the 
Union Pacific (14,256) and the giant Pennsylvania (51,543); the only other large corporations with 
more than 10,000 book shareholders were American Sugar (10,816) and U.S. Steel (54,016).  Gar-
diner C. Means, The Diffusion of Stock Ownership in the United States, 44 Q. J. ECON. 561, 594 
(1930) [hereinafter Diffusion]. 
 27. Ott, When Wall Street, supra note 25, at 620 (A century ago, “no more than three percent of 
households held stocks or bonds.”).  This is not to assert that then, or now, most Americans directly 
owned securities, just that the numbers that did own stocks or bonds rose sharply by the 1920s. 
 28. Means, Diffusion, supra note 26.  Means’s study is illuminating, but any attempt at obtain-
ing exact estimates is stymied by lack of transparency.  His figures show, for example, that the total 
number of book shareholders in the nation’s thirty-one largest firms almost tripled from 1900 to 
1917, but he cannot tell how much of this ownership is duplicative (e.g., one individual owning 
shares in two companies being counted twice) or through intermediaries, nor exactly who these 
individuals are. 
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comparatively small investors.29  The real explosion in stock ownership, 
though, would occur in the 1920s when millions of Americans became 
first-time investors.30 
It is around 1900 that we first find stirring the popular idea that 
ownership and control were separating in the modern corporation.  Well 
before then, of course, there had been corporations with minority share-
holders who were not active in management, 31 and those minority share-
holders had at times suffered oppression at the hands of the controlling 
shareholders who ran their firms. 32  However, there was not a sense that 
these minority shareholders were so numerous or widely dispersed that 
they were a class deserving of extra protection, or that their plight should 
be a major public issue.  Nor was there the sense that some corporations 
were coming under the control, not of a dominant shareholder, but of 
autonomous managers.  What was new after the turn of the century was 
the concern about the growing number of small shareholders, who ap-
peared powerless to influence corporate management—even if they 
wished to do so—and a realization that followed from this: if ownership 
was so diffused that shareholders no longer controlled the corporation 
and if management had taken on that task, then the interests of share-
holders and managers might no longer be the same.  It was these two de-
velopments, the growth of small shareholders and the rise of managers 
with little ownership in the corporation, that came to be lumped together 
as the separation of ownership and control. 
The implications of this development were addressed in the early 
decades of the twentieth century by three writers who left extraordinary 
intellectual legacies: the activist lawyer and later Supreme Court Justice, 
Louis D. Brandeis; journalist, Walter Lippmann; and dissident econo-
mist, Thorstein Veblen.33  Each has been identified as a discoverer of the 
                                                            
 29. See MITCHELL, SPECULATION ECONOMY, supra note 25, at 95–103. 
 30. Ott, When Wall Street, supra note 25, at 620. 
 31. One recent study has found that as early as the 1820s, corporations in New York often had 
many more shareholders than could have been actively involved in management.  The average cor-
poration had seventy-four shareholders, and a few had several hundred.  See Eric Hilt, When Did 
Ownership Separate from Control? Corporate Governance in the Early Nineteenth Century, 68 J. 
ECON. HIST. 645, 663–64 (2008).  These corporations were probably not marked by “managerial 
control,” but “minority control,” with “managers holding stakes that were large enough to make 
them unaccountable to the other shareholders[,] was [likely] quite common.”  Id. at 679. 
 32. On minority shareholders in corporation law during the late nineteenth century, see Naomi 
Lamoreaux & Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, Corporate Governance and the Plight of the Minority Share-
holders in the United States Before the Great Depression, in CORRUPTION AND REFORM: LESSONS 
FROM AMERICA’S ECONOMIC HISTORY 126–29 (Edward Glaeser & Claudia Goldin eds., 2006). 
 33. Others could be added to the list; in addition to Alfred Marshall and William Cook, see 
HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE, supra note 7, at 357–59, one could cite the German politician Walter 
Rathenau, see BERLE & MEANS, MODERN CORPORATION, supra note 1, at 2 n.3, 352, or Woodrow 
Wilson, who described the corporation in a 1910 speech as “an arrangement by which hundreds of 
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separation of ownership and control,34 but to write of them solely in this 
vein misses the mark.  To see them as merely precursors to Berle and 
Means overlooks the significant ways in which each differed from Berle 
and Means in their understanding of the separation of ownership and 
control and its consequences.  From today’s vantage point, the separation 
of ownership and control appears as a problem in corporate governance 
to be solved by mechanisms that would protect shareholders.  Brandeis, 
Lippmann, and Veblen saw it differently. 
B.  Brandeis, Lippmann, Veblen 
In his 1914 collection Other People’s Money and How the Bankers 
Use It, Brandeis honed in on the problem of the separation of ownership 
and control. 35  Brandeis, a crusading public interest lawyer at this stage 
of his life, may have been alerted to the topic by the report of the Pujo 
Committee.  This 1913 congressional investigation into the “money 
trust” concluded that in almost “all great corporations with numerous and 
widely scattered stockholders[,] . . . management is virtually self-
perpetuating and is able through the power of patronage, the indifference 
of stockholders[,] and other influences to control a majority of stock.”36  
It was shortly after receiving the Pujo Committee report that Brandeis 
wrote the essays that became Other People’s Money.37 
In Other People’s Money, Brandeis noted that the dispersion of 
share ownership left the “bonds and stocks of the more important corpo-
rations . . . owned, in large part, by small investors, who do not partici-
pate in the management of the company.”38  Such small investors were 
unable to judge the worth of securities without the help of intermediaries, 
and their dependence “upon the banker [had] grown in recent years, since 
women and others who [did] not participate in the management, [had] 
                                                                                                                                     
thousands of men who would in days gone by have set up in business for themselves put their money 
into a single huge accumulation and place the entire direction of its employment in the hands of men 
they have never seen, with whom they never confer.”  RIPLEY, MAIN STREET, supra note 9, at 5 
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become the owners of so large a part of the stocks and bonds of our great 
corporations.”39  Brandeis had identified the essence of the separation of 
ownership and control, namely the dispersed, powerless shareholders, 
but he concluded that this would leave power not with a corporation’s 
managers, but with its bankers.  This conclusion is not surprising in an 
era when J. P. Morgan dominated U.S. investment banking and orga-
nized giant industrial combinations, and when such bankers’ control had 
just been scrutinized by the Pujo Committee.40  These developments cer-
tainly disadvantaged shareholders, but shareholders were not Brandeis’s 
real concern.41 
Instead, the “separation” in the modern corporation that most wor-
ried Brandeis and that he believed was the fundamental problem of the 
modern corporation was a growing separation between the corporation’s 
managers and their firm.  As the historian Melvin Urofsky noted, Bran-
deis believed that “[c]onsolidations created companies too big for their 
managers to manage responsibly, because they could not know what was 
happening in all of the divisions.”42  This separation, the necessary con-
sequence of corporate consolidations, left the corporation unwieldy and 
inefficient, able to survive by using its power to squash smaller competi-
tors.43  While such separation may have harmed the corporation’s small 
shareholders, it harmed others more, particularly the public.  Brandeis 
criticized the “Money Trust” legislation, legislation designed to break 
banks’ power by prohibiting interlocking directorates.  He argued that 
“the provision would not safeguard the public[,] and [that] the primary 
purpose of the Money Trust legislation is not to prevent directors from 
injuring stockholders, but to prevent them from injuring the public.”44  
Thus, the result of the separation of corporate management and owner-
ship that most concerned Brandeis was the risk of giant corporations 
harming the public and the small proprietors that they competed against, 
not the shareholders.45 
While Brandeis looked back to a time of small-scale proprietary ca-
pitalism, Walter Lippmann looked forward to the era of giant corpora-
                                                            
 39. Id. at 8.  He also noted that over half the stockholders of the American Sugar Refining 
Company and nearly half of the stockholders of the Pennsylvania Railroad and New York, New 
Haven & Hartford were women, which to him signaled that they needed to be protected.  See id. 
 40. See id. On “Morganization” and J.P. Morgan’s bank’s control and consolidation of firms, 
see, for example, J. Bradford De Long, Did J. P. Morgan’s Men Add Value?  An Economist’s Pers-
pective on Financial Capitalism, in INSIDE THE BUSINESS ENTERPRISE: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES 
ON THE USE OF INFORMATION 205, 211–14 (Peter Temin ed., 1991). 
 41. See BRANDEIS, supra note 35, at 80, 131, 191, 199. 
 42. UROFSKY, supra note 36, at 322. 
 43. See UROFSKY, supra note 36, at 322 and passim. 
 44. BRANDEIS, supra note 35, at 80 (emphasis added). 
 45. See UROFSKY, supra note 36, at 397; BRANDEIS, supra note 35, at 205. 
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tions.  Lippmann discussed the separation of ownership and control in his 
1913 paean to progressive planning, Drift and Mastery.46  Writing of 
giant corporations, he noted that “[i]n the partnership and firm, owners 
and managers are in general the same people, but the corporation has 
separated ownership from management.”47  He also recognized, well be-
fore Berle and Means, that the consequence of this separation would be a 
change in the very notion of ownership and property: 
When a man buys stock in some large corporation he becomes in 
theory one of its owners.  He is supposed to be exercising his in-
stinct of private property.  But how in fact does he exercise that in-
stinct[,] which we are told is the only real force in civilization?  He 
may never see his property.  He may not know where his property is 
situated.  He is not consulted as to its management.  He would be 
utterly incapable of advice if he were consulted . . . .  The processes 
which make him rich in the morning and poor in the evening, in-
crease his income or decrease it,[]are inscrutable mysteries. . . .  No 
one has ever had a more abstract relation to the thing he owned.48 
What differentiates Lippmann from many later writers, including 
Berle and Means, is that he did not see this separation as a problem.  One 
notable feature of his discussion is how little he cared about stockhold-
ers.  He wrote, 
You often hear it said that the stockholders must be made to realize 
their duties. . . .  But the notion that the 200,000 owners of the Steel 
Trust can ever be aroused to energetic, public-spirited control of 
‘their’ property—that is as fantastic as anything that ever issued 
from the brain of a lazy moralist.  Scattered all over the globe, 
changing from day to day, the shareholders are the most incompe-
tent constituency conceivable.49 
Far from seeing shareholders as suffering or requiring greater protections 
from management, he disparaged “ignorant stockholders . . . who don’t 
know the difference between puddling and pudding.”50  He portrayed 
them as “decadent”51 and as a slowly disappearing vestige.  “Private 
property will melt away,” he predicted, and “its functions will be taken 
over by the salaried men who direct them, by the government commis-
                                                            
 46. See McCraw, Berle and Means, supra note 34, at 583; L. S. Zacharias, Repaving the Bran-
deis Way: The Decline of Developmental Property, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 596, 627 n.145 (1988) (noting 
that Lippmann has been credited with anticipating Berle and Means’s view of property, though ar-
guing the immediate source may have been Brandeis). 
 47. WALTER LIPPMANN, DRIFT AND MASTERY 48 (Prentice-Hall 1961) (1914). 
 48. Id. at 47. 
 49. Id. at 48. 
 50. Id. at 39–40. 
 51. Id. at 51. 
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sions, [and] by developing labor unions.  The stockholders deprived of 
their property rights are being transformed into money-lenders.”52 
For Lippmann, the separation of ownership and control was a wel-
come moment in social evolution.  Power was shifting to management, to 
the “salaried men” who were hired by the firm’s owners,53 and manage-
ment was itself changing, transcending the profit-seeking behavior of 
owner-operators and taking on a new social role.54  He wrote further: 
[Managers] on salary, divorced from ownership and from bargain-
ing[] . . . represent the revolution in business incentives at its very 
heart.  For they conduct giant enterprises and they stand outside the 
higgling of the market, outside the shrewdness and strategy of com-
petition.  The motive of profit is not their personal motive. . . .  The 
administration of the great industries is passing into the hands of 
men who cannot halt before each transaction and ask themselves: 
what is my duty as the Economic Man looking for immediate 
gain?55 
He believed that managers, freed from shareholders, would also be freed 
from the demands of the “profit system,” and they would use their exper-
tise to become “industrial statesmen,” running the corporations in the 
interest of society.56 
The period’s most idiosyncratic take on the separation of ownership 
and control may have been that of the radical economist Thorstein Veb-
len.57  Veblen discussed the separation of ownership and control quite 
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ment of his works. 
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early in his 1904 Theory of Business Enterprise58 and returned to it two 
decades later in Absentee Ownership.59 
There are passages in The Theory of Business Enterprise where 
Veblen sounds like a herald of Berle and Means, writing that “[i]n so far 
as invested property is managed by the methods of modern corporate 
finance, . . . the management is separated from the ownership of the 
property, more and more widely as the scope of corporation finance wi-
dens.”60  He also notes that the effect of modern finance is to “dissociate 
ownership from management.”61 
On closer examination, though, one discovers that these statements 
must be interpreted through Veblen’s highly idiosyncratic views of cor-
porate finance.  The separation Veblen sees in the modern corporation—
at least as presented in Theory of Business Enterprise—is not, in any 
straightforward way, a separation of shareholders and management.  It is 
instead a separation of two kinds of shareholders: passive owners of 
common stock and managers who own preferred stock.  According to 
Veblen, modern corporations were increasingly capitalized based on the 
value of both tangible assets (for example, machinery) and intangible 
assets (for example, goodwill). Modern corporations also issued both 
preferred and common shares, with only common shares voting.  The 
preferred shares had a claim on, in Veblen’s view, the more stable part of 
the corporation’s worth, its tangible assets.62  Managers desirous of keep-
ing control sold preferred shares to outside investors and kept the com-
mon shares for themselves.  The result of this was to give the preferred 
shareholders a prior claim on, and in effect to make them owners of, the 
corporation’s tangible assets.  This “method of capitalization,” Veblen 
wrote, “effects a somewhat thoroughgoing separation between the man-
agement and the ownership of the industrial equipment. . . .  [U]nder 
corporate organization the owners of the industrial material have no 
voice in its management[.]”63  Veblen, who looked skeptically at all 
forms of corporate finance, appeared to believe that the “real” corpora-
tion was the firm’s tangible assets.  Therefore, the preferred sharehold-
ers, who had a prior claim on these assets, were the corporation’s real 
owners.  Ultimately, he used this theory of corporate finance not to de-
                                                            
 58. THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THEORY OF THE BUSINESS ENTERPRISE (1904) [hereinafter THEORY]. 
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fend these preferred shareholders, but to attack corporate managers and 
their evanescent claims on the corporation.  Veblen did not care about 
powerless shareholders. 
Absentee Ownership offers a somewhat different theory than the 
earlier work but invites similar misreadings.  To a reader familiar with 
Berle and Means, the very title suggests an attack on the separation of 
management and shareholding.  Yet Veblen is again uninterested in that 
separation.  The absentee owners he discusses, far from being small vul-
nerable shareholders, are the idle rich, the parasites who have bought 
shares and so own “essentially claims to unearned income[.]”64  While 
absent, these investors still control the corporation—a “system of absen-
tee ownership and control[.]”65 
In Absentee Ownership, the separation that draws Veblen is be-
tween absentee owners and those who operate the corporation’s machi-
nery and the industrial system as a whole.  Absentee owners, he writes, 
“are removed out of all touch with the working personnel or with the in-
dustrial work in hand, . . . and very much the same is true for the busi-
ness agents of the absentee owners, the investment-bankers and the staff 
of responsible corporation officials.”66  Not only are absentee owners 
removed from the firms that they own, but also their interests are actively 
hostile to such firms.  This is because, Veblen argues, they need to re-
strict output in order to make money, an act that Veblen describes as “sa-
botage” of the industrial system.67  “The material interest of the underly-
ing population is best served by a maximum output at a low cost, while 
the business interests of the industry’s owners may best be served by a 
moderate output at an enhanced price.”68  Nowhere do dispersed share-
holders appear in Veblen’s account, and his concerns are far from those 
of modern advocates of corporate governance. It should not be surprising 
that Veblen, scornful of absentee owners and businessmen, would soon 
be an advocate of Technocracy, the political ideology that favored re-
placing capitalism with a system run by engineers and whose rallying cry 
was “production for use.”69 
Thus, even before World War I, the idea of managerial dominance 
of the corporation and lack of shareholder power was present in public 
discourse, but in a variety of often conflicting forms.  Yet those ideas 
would not be given their enduring modern shape until The Modern Cor-
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poration and Private Property appeared more than a decade later.  To 
understand why, we must look towards those ideas’ careers in the 1920s, 
especially to the man who did most to popularize them, William Z. Rip-
ley. 
III.  “PROFESSOR QUIXOTE” 
In 1927, the radical journalist Stewart Chase reviewed William Z. 
Ripley’s book Main Street and Wall Street for The Nation magazine.70  
The book was a sharp attack on modern corporate management, one that 
brought the idea of the separation of ownership and control and the prob-
lems it created to a mass audience.  In his review, Chase dubbed Ripley 
“Professor Quixote” and wrote that “[a]ll the world knows how a couple 
of [Ripley’s] articles in the Atlantic Monthly swept the financial centers 
of the country, put their author and his opinions into the headlines and 
the editorials of every newspaper,” and forced changes at the New York 
Stock Exchange.71  Underlying the review, however, is a sense of sur-
prise; how did a “bespectacled professor” from Harvard’s economics 
department come to terrorize Wall Street? 
A.  Race and Railroads  
Born in 1867 outside of Boston, William Zebina Ripley was a 
graduate of MIT and received his doctorate in political economy from 
Columbia in 1893.72  In a time when the borders between the social 
sciences were still fluid,73 his interests ranged widely.  His dissertation 
was a financial history of colonial Virginia.74  From 1893 to 1901 he 
taught political science, sociology, and economics at MIT along with 
sociology and anthropology at Columbia.  In 1901, he moved to Harvard 
as professor of economics, where he would spend the rest of his career.75 
His first brush with fame came not as an economist but as an anth-
ropologist, writing in the then-popular (now long discredited) field of 
“scientific” racism.  In 1899, Ripley published The Races of Europe, an 
exhaustive work now considered to be “the most influential work on race 
during the early years of this century.”76  Ripley spent over six hundred 
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pages arguing that previous scholars had erred in concluding there was 
only one white, or Aryan, race in Europe.77  Instead, he argued that care-
ful study, particularly the use of the “cephalic index” revealed by head 
measurements, showed that there were three races native to Europe: Teu-
tonic, Alpine, and Mediterranean.78  While the work focused on these 
three groups, Ripley also examined the Jewish population of Europe, 
writing darkly of the Jewish population in Eastern Europe and the danger 
that this “swamp of miserable human beings . . . threatens to drain itself 
off into our country.”79  It is little surprise that his work would find favor 
with advocates of immigration restriction.80 
What does this have to do with corporate governance?  Directly, 
very little.  Ripley would later write critically of corporate managers and 
Wall Street, but there is no trace in later writings of the kinds of anti-
semitism or conspiratorial thinking that characterized some populist op-
ponents of Wall Street and corporate finance.81  Surprisingly, despite his 
racial theorizing, Ripley’s own politics put him into the progressive tra-
dition.  In a 1909 essay, he wrote favorably of immigration and even in-
termarriage among ethnic groups, and called for an “active programme 
of social betterment,” including “more and better schools[,]” “[h]umane 
regulation of [factory] hours[,]” and revived trade unions.82  In 1916, he 
was one of the few Harvard professors to support Louis Brandeis’s nom-
ination to the Supreme Court.83 
What his early career as a racial theorist does illustrate is that Rip-
ley consistently reached out for a wide audience.  The Races of Europe 
began as a series of public lectures presented at Boston’s Lowell Insti-
tute, and earlier versions of some chapters were published in Popular 
Science magazine.84   When Ripley sought an even broader audience for 
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his ideas after the turn of the century, he was able to publish articles on 
racial issues, and later railroad organization and finance, in Atlantic 
Monthly.85  Long before writing Main Street and Wall Street, Ripley was 
adept at cultivating a public audience for his ideas.  
His writing on race tapered off after the turn of the century as Rip-
ley began building a reputation as perhaps the nation’s leading expert on 
its indispensable and deeply troubled railroads.86  Railroads dominated 
transportation, but this did not guarantee them economic success.87  Long 
loathed by farmers, small merchants, and reformers, railroads had been 
plagued for decades by overbuilding, destructive competition, and bank-
ruptcies.  By the early twentieth century, these perennial difficulties were 
joined by growing government rate regulation.88  High and variable rail-
road rates had long been targets for reformers, but only after the turn of 
the century did the federal government’s Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion (ICC) gain clear legislative power to regulate them.89  Railroads’ 
troubles culminated with World War I when the federal government 
seized the railroads and ran them directly.90 
Ripley was both an expert on railroads and an active participant in 
making railroad policy.  Beginning with a stint at the U.S. Industrial 
Commission in 1901, he held several significant positions, culminating 
in 1920 when the ICC asked him to prepare a national plan for railroad 
consolidation.91  Though his plan was voted down, he continued as a 
consultant to the ICC through the 1920s. 
Ripley’s work on railroads demonstrates his decidedly non-radical, 
progressive orientation.  He began his career as a critic of the railroads, 
but after the ICC won the power to set rates he became more sympathetic 
to the rail lines and their need for adequate income, warning that punitive 
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rate setting could severely damage the rails.92  Ripley’s work on railroad 
regulation may have been a proving-ground for his later writings on Wall 
Street, for by the 1910s he was perhaps the leading expert on railroad 
finance. 
B.  The Present Economic Revolution 
When Ripley turned to studying corporate finance in the 1920s, he 
found a field undergoing rapid changes.  While the authors discussed in 
the previous Part all recognized the spread of shareholding after 1900, it 
was only after World War I that new retail shareholders flooded into the 
market.93  The trend toward widened securities ownership had started 
accelerating during World War I, as Americans purchased the popular 
Liberty Bonds in record numbers to fund the war effort.94  At war’s end, 
Americans, made comfortable with securities purchases, were further 
encouraged to purchase bonds and, increasingly, stocks, by the spread of 
national retail brokerages and, at many corporations, customer and em-
ployee stock ownership plans.95  Although exact numbers are hard to 
come by, one recent study estimates that stock ownership increased from 
“a few hundred thousand before World War I (about three percent of 
U.S. households) to an estimated [eight] million by 1929 (roughly a 
quarter of households).”96 
An almost necessary consequence of the increase in investors was 
the further dispersion of stock ownership, creating for the first time a 
mass shareholding class.  While some prewar writers had seen problems 
lurking with the dispersal of stock ownership, the earliest postwar ob-
servers welcomed the trend.97  These writers heralded ever-widening 
stock ownership as a salve for social problems because it promised to 
give ordinary Americans a stake in the nation’s growing corporate econ-
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omy.98  In 1925, Ripley’s Harvard economics colleague Thomas Nixon 
Carver gave voice to this view in his work The Present Economic Revo-
lution in the United States.  Carver announced that widespread owner-
ship would solve the “labor problem” by making small investors “small 
capitalists.”99  A similar tack was taken by the philanthropist Robert 
Brookings in Industrial Ownership, published the same year.  In this 
book, Brookings noted two crucial developments in twentieth-century 
capitalism: the separation of ownership and management and the widen-
ing dispersal of share ownership, which he foresaw continuing until 
ownership was “diffused among the largest share of the population.”100  
Like Carver, Brookings saw no problems arising from these develop-
ments.  While Berle and Means would see in the separation of ownership 
and control an opportunity for managers to appropriate shareholder 
wealth, Brookings concluded that the dispersal of ownership would have 
the opposite effect, giving management an increasing sense of responsi-
bility toward shareholders.  “The widespread diffusion of ownership and 
the increasing sense of responsibility to management to all the interested 
parties,” he wrote, “point to a satisfactory solution of ‘the industrial 
problem.’”101 
Although not always noted by its proponents, these works’ sunny 
vision of the ordinary American as shareholder also hints at a more fun-
damental shift in the orientation of corporate governance.102  If Carver 
and Nixon were right that ordinary Americans’ wealth and security was 
now tied directly to their status as shareholders, then the well-being of 
shareholders qua shareholders suddenly jumped in importance.103  No 
longer was the fundamental problem in corporation law to be that corpo-
rations damaged competitors or the public; now the chief concern in cor-
poration law was for the shareholders.  As the historian Julia Ott puts it, 
under this vision of universal shareholder democracy, “the maximization 
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of shareholders’ returns was the most important consideration in corpo-
rate governance and economic policy.”104 
C.  From Main Street to Wall Street 
During the mid-1920s, William Ripley would bring the separation 
of ownership and control before the public and spark a national debate 
over corporate governance.  His initial public foray was at a seemingly 
modest venue, the annual meeting of New York’s Academy of Political 
Science, where in November 1925 he gave a talk on “Two Changes in 
the Nature and Conduct of Corporations,” which he asserted went to the 
“very tap-root of our capitalistic system.” 105  The first was “the divorce 
of ownership of property, represented by securities emitted by corpora-
tions or trustees, from any direct accountability, whatsoever, for its pru-
dent and effective management.”  The second was the diffusion of that 
ownership, “the wide distribution of stock to employees and to consum-
ers of the corporation’s product[.]”106  The result, Ripley announced, was 
“the assumption of an absolute control by intermediaries—most com-
monly bankers[—] . . . in place of the former responsibility for direction 
which, theoretically at least, rested upon the shoulders of the actual own-
ers.”107 
Some of Ripley’s conclusions had already been reached by others.  
His critique of bankers’ control, in particular, sounded little different 
from critiques made of Morgan decades before.  He innovated, though, 
when he identified two separate elements in what we have since lumped 
together as the separation of ownership and control.  To him, separation 
of ownership and management was one problem, exacerbated by dis-
persed shareholding.  This latter development turned the separation of 
ownership and control into a problem for the general public. 
His attack took on urgency because, he claimed, the separation of 
ownership and control had reached a tipping point.  Neither the separa-
tion nor shareholder passivity was new, he admitted; shareholders had 
“always been inert, delegating most of their power,” but there had still 
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remained the possibility that they might “be stimulated to assert them-
selves.”108  New innovations in corporate finance promised to put an end 
to that.  He illustrated his point by citing the recent public offering of 
Dodge Brothers, Inc.  Purchased by the banking house of Dillon, Reed in 
1924 for $146,000,000, the investment house took the automaker public 
again a year later, selling $160,000,000 of bonds and preferred and 
common stock.  But, Ripley pointed out, the new Dodge Bros. had a new 
kind of capital structure with two kinds of common stock, “Class A” and 
“Class B.”  Only the Class B stock had voting power.109  Dillon Reed, 
unsurprisingly, sold the Class A and kept the Class B, stripping all power 
from most of the company’s putative owners.  How, Ripley asked his 
audience, “can there be other than a whirlwind of abuse of power under 
such conditions?”110  For all Ripley’s criticism of corporate controllers, 
however, he offered only anodyne solutions to the problem in his speech, 
calling for better publicity for corporate accounts and standardized ac-
counting under the aegis of a revamped Federal Trade Commission 
(FTC).111  
What separated Ripley from the cheerleaders for shareholder de-
mocracy was that he emphasized the dangers inherent in widening own-
ership—a point made by an editorial the New York Times published after 
his talk.  It said that Ripley’s talk had cast “the corrosive of a doubt” on 
previous “rejoicing over the wide diffusion of ownership in the nation’s 
industries[.]”112  In linking widening ownership and the separation of 
ownership and control, Ripley also looked forward to modern debates on 
corporate governance by moving the shareholder to the center of con-
cern.  “Precisely as the ‘trust’ of old menaced the consumer,” concluded 
the Times, “closed management of corporations menaces the diffused 
owner.”113   
Ripley’s speech garnered wide attention.  The New York Times de-
voted two columns to it the next day and reported that it had “stirred the 
assembly.”114  It made the Wall Street Journal soon thereafter.  The 
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Journal reported that Ripley’s speech had met “with considerable inter-
est” from bankers, enough so that the Bank of America felt compelled to 
issue a statement stoutly denying Ripley’s charges and stating there was 
no need for further government regulation of business.115  In mid-
November, a speaker at the New York Banker’s Institute more forcefully 
rebutted Ripley’s claims, and echoed Thomas Carver’s earlier conclu-
sions, insisting that diffuse ownership in fact benefitted shareholders 
while giving “the responsible executives of the utilities more of a sense 
of fiduciary accountability to these investor-owners and less of a sense of 
control by a few men, inside or outside of banking circles.”116  
Over the next year, Ripley would conduct a campaign that would 
inject the separation of ownership and control and the diffusion of stock 
ownership into the center of public debate, lead to significant changes by 
the New York Stock Exchange, and even involve the President of the 
United States.  It began with his New York speech and gained steam in 
January 1926, when Ripley expanded upon his charges in an article en-
titled, From Main Street to Wall Street, in the Atlantic Monthly, then one 
of the nation’s most-read magazines.117  With a title playing off Sinclair 
Lewis’s recent novel Main Street—indeed, Ripley appears to have in-
vented the “Main Street and Wall Street” cliché118—the article caused a 
national sensation.  If remembered at all, the article is now remembered 
for launching a campaign against nonvoting common stock,119 but its 
ambit was larger.  It was an attack on modern corporate governance. 
From Main Street to Wall Street opened with a somewhat strained 
parable about a young man from Maine who was given shares in the lo-
cal power company by his father.  The father gave his son a short lecture 
on the duties of ownership along with the shares: “You must never forget 
that you are partly responsible for this undertaking. . . .  That responsibil-
ity is an inseparable part of your ownership.”120  Quoting Justice Bran-
deis, the father continued: 
‘There is no such thing to my mind . . . as an innocent shareholder.  
He may be innocent in fact, but he cannot be held innocent.  He ac-
cepts the benefits of the system.  It is his business and his obligation 
to see that those who represent him carry out a policy which is con-
sistent with the public welfare.’ . . .  This accountability for wealth 
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underlies and justifies the whole institution of private property upon 
which the government of our great country is founded.121 
Yet economic developments in Ripley’s story soon thwarted the 
son’s attempt to exercise the responsibilities of ownership.  A utility 
holding company bought the small Maine power company, and the son 
found his ownership transmuted into ownership of shares in a national 
firm, based in Chicago with tens of thousands of shareholders and own-
ing power companies in states from Maine to Oklahoma to Nebraska.122  
“It began to look indeed as if the days of the simple life and of direct re-
sponsibility of ownership were by way of passing in the field of public 
utilities in New England.”123 
Ripley’s critique was not limited to utilities holding companies, a 
major issue in the 1920s.  When his Maine shareholder looked for a cor-
poration to invest in where he could exercise the responsibilities of own-
ership, the son found that firms used voting trusts and pyramiding own-
ership to avoid shareholder involvement.  “Hopeless indeed did it appear 
that any uninitiated public investor could understand, much less partici-
pate intelligently in, any of these affairs.”124 
According to Ripley, these developments not only cut shareholders 
off from a voice in their corporations but also undermined the traditional 
justifications offered for private property.  “What an amazing tangle this 
all makes of the theory that ownership of property and responsibility for 
its efficient, public-spirited, and far-sighted management shall be linked 
one to the other.”125  The developments enabled managerial exploitation 
of shareholders, for under such arrangements it was likely that manage-
ment’s interests would diverge from shareholders’ interests.  Ripley ex-
plained, 
All managers—that is to say, the operating men—are working on 
salary, their returns, except on the side, being largely independent of 
the net result of company operation year by year.  The motive of 
self-interest may even have been thrown into the reverse, occasio-
nally, so far as long-time upbuilding in contradistinction to quick 
turnover in corporate affairs is concerned.126 
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The new system not only threatened shareholders but also the entire eco-
nomic order: “Veritably, the institution of private property, underlying 
our whole civilization, is threatened at the root unless we take heed.”127 
Having set out the overarching problem, Ripley then concentrated 
his fire on nonvoting common stock, which he believed threatened to put 
“at rest the last vestige of power of participation of the owners of proper-
ty in prudent and efficient management.”128  Nonvoting common stock 
threatened shareholders in two ways.  First, it left them open to mana-
gerial exploitation, and second, it destroyed any responsibility they felt 
for their property, resulting in a “bald and outrageous theft of the last title 
of responsibility for management of the actual owners by those who are 
setting up these latest financial erections.”129 
Nonvoting stock was a major problem, but not the only one Ripley 
tackled in the article.  Another was the diffusion of stock ownership, en-
couraged in the 1920s by the growth of employee and consumer stock 
purchase plans, a development that would only concentrate more power 
in managers.130  The “wide distribution of stock to employees and the 
consumers of the corporation’s product, . . .” he wrote, would have an 
effect that was “bound to be cumulative with that of the insinuation of 
professional management power between ownership and operation.”131  
“[T]he larger the number of shareholders,” Ripley wrote, “the more easi-
ly may a small concentrated block of minority shares exercise control 
over all the rest. . . .  With 300,000 scattered holdings, a possible [fifteen] 
or [twenty] percent of the votes can never be overmatched at an elec-
tion.”132 
But what to do about these developments?  Ripley, unlike Louis 
Brandeis, did not call for the restoration of a perhaps mythical era of 
small corporations and proprietor-managers.  Nor did he assert that 
shareholder disengagement from active management was new.  “It will 
be objected,” he wrote, “that no real change is involved in these recent 
tendencies[,] that stockholders never did, and never will, exercise their 
voting rights.”133  Yet, he continued, the mere potential for shareholder 
action mattered: “[E]very once in a blue moon some resolute individual 
or stockholder could rise . . . and organize a protective committee or dis-
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senting group.”134  This would be foreclosed if “the people who own that 
property have allowed themselves to be utterly divorced from the exer-
cise of their natural right to elect the directors and to influence . . . the 
corporate policy.”135 
In his article, Ripley put forward a flurry of proposals for solving 
the problems he identified.  Perhaps bondholders should be enfranchised 
as well as shareholders, cumulative voting more widely adopted, or the 
federal government could regulate holding companies.136  But Ripley’s 
main solution was publicity.  During the 1920s, required disclosure was 
minimal to nonexistent.137  State-mandated disclosure, he believed, 
would reveal “the amount of gross business, the cost of conducting it, 
and especially the policy respecting upkeep and depreciation” at a corpo-
ration.  Disclosure would also aid the shareholder who, even if not 
equipped to personally evaluate the data, would be able to benefit from 
the “intelligent judgment of competent experts” who could provide such 
analysis.138 
Ripley closed his first article by demanding that his readers recog-
nize “there is something the matter.”139  It had not yet reached a crisis 
point, but it was becoming more pressing with the “great incursion into 
the field of investment by the common people—corporate possession 
being shared by those of moderate and small means with the wealthy 
class.”140  What, he asked, “would be the effect were these newco-
mers . . . to discover some day that ownership and control had parted 
company, each going its way as ships that pass in the night?”141  The vi-
sion of ownership remaining with the people, while control rested in the 
“great financial centers,” led Ripley to foresee greater problems and da-
maging social divisions.  He wrote, “We have had the experience, to our 
sorrow, with the old sectional divisions between the East and the West.  
Is there no smoldering spark in this matter of corporate control, which 
may some day flare up as a political issue of the first order?”142 
The “spark in this matter” turned out to be Ripley’s own article, 
though he may have been surprised that public anger focused on only one 
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of his targets: nonvoting common stock.143  Within weeks of From Main 
Street to Wall Street’s publication, an outcry arose sufficient to force the 
New York Stock Exchange to disapprove an issue of nonvoting common 
for the first time, and thereafter, it refused to list such stock.144  Later that 
year, the ICC disapproved a reorganization that included a voting trust, 
stating that “the public interest requires that the entire body of the stock-
holders of a railroad . . . and not a powerful few, shall be responsible for 
management.”  The New Jersey Public Utility Commission blocked a 
stock issue loaded with nonvoting shares on similar grounds soon af-
ter.145  That spring, several corporations that reorganized their capital 
structure specifically rejected the use of nonvoting common stock, and in 
announcements of their actions, they “called attention along with other 
‘selling points’ to the fact that all stock carried full voting rights.”146  So 
loud was the public outcry that in February 1926 President Calvin Coo-
lidge met with Ripley at the White House to discuss the problem of non-
voting common stock.147 
Ripley’s campaign against managerial power stirred not only poli-
cy-makers but also the general public.  In perhaps the most telling exam-
ple of the attention garnered by his crusade, the New York World pub-
lished a poem in the spring of 1926 entitled, “On Waiting in Vain for the 
New Masses to Denounce Nonvoting Stock,” which may also have made 
a wry commentary on the plight of the retail shareholder compared to 
that of the real working class: 
Then you who drive the fractious nail 
And you who lay the heavy rail, 
And all who bear the dinner pail 
And daily punch the clock— 
Shall it be said your hearts are stone? 
They are your brethren and they groan! 
Oh, drop a tear for those who own 
Nonvoting corporate stock.148 
While nonvoting stock tended to dominate press coverage in the 
spring of 1926, Ripley’s broader concerns also gained currency, in part 
because nonvoting stock served as a synecdoche for shareholders’ more 
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pervasive loss of control.  Thus, a 1926 article in the New York Times 
entitled, “Voteless Stock Stirs Wall Street,” presented the case against 
nonvoting stock while also summarizing Ripley’s larger concerns.149  In 
its account, nonvoting common stock was only a symptom of more basic 
changes in corporate governance.  For instance, the article described the 
Dodge Brothers reorganization as “typical of a movement, gaining mo-
mentum rapidly during the past few years, that tends to shift the entire 
centre of industrial control from the ‘owner,’ in the traditional sense of 
the word, to the investment banker.”  Alongside nonvoting common 
stock, it highlighted the dispersal of stock ownership and the growth of 
complex holding companies as causes of that shift.150  “In this divorce of 
ownership from responsibility, of financial risk from actual control,” it 
continued, “the critics see the likelihood of a dangerous abuse of pow-
er.”151 
Ripley’s crusade had quickly defeated nonvoting stock, but its larg-
er goals were not so easily reached.152  In August 1926, he followed with 
a second article in the Atlantic entitled, Stop, Look, Listen! The Share-
holder’s Right to Adequate Information,153 where he expanded on his 
attack on corporate reporting, again framing this specific problem as an 
outgrowth of more basic economic changes. 
The article opened with a labored metaphor.  Two roads intersected, 
initially unregulated and little-traveled.  As the volume of traffic increas-
es, Ripley wrote, as inattentive, “careless or drunken drivers” appear, 
“then as the appalling records of death and casualties betokens, the time 
has come for public supervision of the crossways.”154  To fix the prob-
lem, “the simple remedy of visibility suggests itself.”155  The comparison 
is clear: 
Main Street and Wall Street have come to cross one another at right 
angles—Main Street, our synonym for this phenomenon of wide-
spread ownership, and Wall Street, as applied to the well-known 
aggregation of financial and of directorial power in our great capital 
centres.  This intersection of interest[s], so often at cross-purposes, 
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is marked by an imminent danger of collision at the junction point 
of ownership and management.156 
His solution to the intersection between Main Street and Wall Street was 
better visibility; in the corporate context, more publicity. 
At the time, corporations were required to produce little or no in-
formation for shareholders, and this lack of financial data was Ripley’s 
target.157  While some firms regularly issued audited balance sheets and 
income statements, many did not, and Ripley did not hesitate to attack 
those firms whose disclosures he judged insufficient.  Indeed, part of his 
popularity was his willingness to name names.  Firms such as Singer 
Manufacturing and Royal Baking Powder, he reported, gave shareholders 
essentially no financial information, while many others provided at best a 
short balance sheet.158  Even corporations providing more copious infor-
mation often failed to explain how figures were reached, a major prob-
lem in an era before standardized accounting rules.159 
Ripley’s discussion of corporate information highlights a disjunc-
tion in his views of the shareholder, one marking a transition from older 
views of activist shareholders to a new recognition of the shareholder as, 
chiefly, a passive investor.160  He believed that additional information 
would help the shareholder, but this raised the question of how exactly 
the shareholder would benefit from it.  At times, Ripley had held out 
some hope for at least an attenuated version of shareholder activism, 
suggesting that better information would create a more engaged share-
holder.  In From Main Street to Wall Street, he highlighted a few in-
stances where individual shareholders were able to “overcome a corpo-
rate Goliath,” including the long shareholder campaign waged by Charles 
and Philip Cabot, which in the 1910s eventually persuaded U.S. Steel to 
abandon the twelve-hour workday.161  In his 1927 book Main Street and 
Wall Street, however, Ripley conceded that most shareholders had no 
desire or ability to become involved in corporate management: 
[A]ny plan for the greater democratization of corporate manage-
ment which is based upon the expectation of a general active partic-
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ipation by the whole body of shareholders is bound to go wrong 
from the crossing of the wire. . . .  The average stockholder is en-
tirely unqualified to engage actively in management.  For a surpri-
singly large number of great corporations more than half of the 
shareholders are women. . . .  Such a multitude are ill-fitted by train-
ing—begging the moot point of sex—to govern directly, less so 
than in politics. . . .  Even the men by themselves, for the most part, 
have neither time, impulse, nor capacity for such concerns.  The 
very practice of scattering investments, spreading the risk, would in 
a considerable estate constitute an aggregate burden of bother which 
would be backbreaking.162 
Information would typically not, Ripley concluded, help sharehold-
ers be better governors of the corporation.  Instead, it would help them in 
their role as investors.  Once corporate information was provided, he 
wrote, “specialists, analysts, bankers, and others will promptly dissemi-
nate the information.”163  This was an interesting concession.  Even as 
Ripley searched for ways to maintain the shareholder franchise, he ad-
mitted that, in this context, it would not be effective.  Shareholders 
would benefit from better information not because it would empower 
them to better participate in management but because it would indirectly 
protect their economic interests: “This, then, is the ultimate defense of 
publicity.  It is not as an adjunct to democratization through exercise of 
voting power, but as a contribution to the making of a true market 
price.”164 
As to how information should be forced from corporations, Ripley 
quickly discarded proposals for  self-regulation and public pressure.  
While he praised the NYSE’s disclosure mandates, he concluded they 
were easily avoided by any firm that did not wish to trade on that ex-
change.165  Nor was state-level regulation a solution, as the weakness of 
state “blue-sky” securities laws showed they could easily be avoided.166  
His solution was federal action, specifically for the FTC to require de-
tailed disclosure by corporations.  Ripley closed his article with an argu-
ment that the FTC already had the statutory authority to require disclo-
sure, if only it wished.167  
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Ripley’s second article again shook Wall Street—this time more 
literally.  Advance copies of Stop, Look, Listen! reached New York early 
on August 24, 1926.  By the middle of the day, many brokerages were 
referring to the article in market comments they circulated to customers 
and brokers, apparently highlighting the damage Ripley’s criticisms 
could do to public confidence in corporations and the possibility that 
they would lead to new reporting requirements.168  The result, according 
to market observers, was a sharp-sell off that sent the market lower at the 
end of the day.169  While some on Wall Street actually favored better dis-
closure—it had been a cause of the NYSE’s for the past year—many 
others feared disclosure or at least feared Ripley’s criticisms. 
The article also caused ripples in the nation’s capital.  Days after it 
appeared, several FTC Commissioners insisted that the FTC Act did not 
give them the authority Ripley claimed.170  The President was soon 
drawn into the debate as well.  Coolidge was reported to have spent some 
of the summer studying corporate issues, “inspired by Professor Ripley’s 
previous utterances on nonvoting stock.”171  Yet, while Coolidge claimed 
to be “in full sympathy” with better corporate reporting, he rejected fed-
eral intervention, reasoning that corporations “get their life from [s]tate 
laws” and thus reporting requirements were a state concern.172 
Stop, Look, Listen! also kept Ripley in the spotlight.  The month it 
appeared, the New York Times ran a profile entitled When Ripley Speaks, 
Wall Street Heeds, which opened with the surprised observation that “the 
Stock Exchange, the bankers, the big investment corporations, and the 
corporate lawyers have taken quite seriously a criticism of their system 
and practices which comes from the occupant of an academic chair at 
Harvard University.”173  As his star rose, however, Ripley became the 
target of more pointed criticism.  Shortly after the appearance of Stop, 
Look, Listen!, his claims came under fire from conservative Wall Street 
lawyer Gilbert Montague, who expanded his criticisms in an article en-
titled More Government in Business—Does Wall Street Need It, or Main 
Street Want It?174  Montague’s answer was, of course, “No,” and he took 
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pains to insist, against a wide array of evidence, that corporations’ offic-
ers and directors were providing shareholders more than sufficient in-
formation and always stood ready to answer any additional requests for 
information that might come from shareholders.175 
A more substantial and subtle response addressed not only Ripley’s 
worries about corporate disclosure but also his underlying analysis of 
dispersed ownership and the separation of ownership and control.  In an 
interview that appeared a month after Stop, Look, Listen!, General Mo-
tors (GM) president Alfred P. Sloan answered Ripley’s criticisms.176  
After defending GM’s reports to shareholders (which were remarkably 
transparent for the day) and insisting less plausibly that he did not know 
of a corporate executive who felt “resentful of public curiosity about his 
company’s affairs,” Sloan then turned to a second question: “Can a cor-
poration have too many stockholders?”177  At some point, Sloan con-
ceded, a corporation’s ownership could be too widespread: “[T]here is a 
point beyond which diffusion of stock ownership must enfeeble the cor-
poration by depriving it of virile interest in management upon the part of 
some one man or group of men to whom its success is a matter of per-
sonal and vital interest.”178  GM, however, had found a happy medium.  
While it had 70,000 small shareholders, they owned only forty percent of 
its stock; the remaining sixty percent was held by a “small group of 
men,” mainly the DuPont family, though Sloan did not name them.179  In 
Ripley’s terms, GM had a “control group.”  To Ripley, a control group, 
which he depicted most often as investment bankers rather than large 
shareholders, posed a threat to shareholders that increased with share-
holding dispersal among small investors.  In Sloan’s telling, however, the 
existence of a control group was not a problem but “the strongest possi-
ble safeguard of the public interest.”180  Such a control group would “lose 
no opportunity to see that the management is sound, industrious, and 
progressive,” a development that would benefit all shareholders, majority 
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and minority alike.181  Sloan had taken two of the main targets of Rip-
ley’s criticism—the existence of minority controlling groups and dis-
persed, powerless shareholders—and argued that they were both 
strengths of the system. 
In the fall of 1926, Ripley’s campaign moved into higher gear.  
Two months after the Atlantic published the article on corporate publici-
ty, it published a third.  More Light!—and Power Too was both an attack 
on the pyramided utilities holding companies assembled during the 
1920s and another opportunity to reiterate the themes of Ripley’s pre-
vious two articles.182  Since the end of World War I, Ripley argued, utili-
ties holding companies had sprung up and then consolidated across the 
nation, often with multiple levels of holding companies standing between 
a local utility and a national parent.183  Their complex capital structures 
and layered ownership often allowed control to be wielded by those con-
trolling the topmost firm, even if they held only a small ownership stake 
in the whole complex.184  The holding companies’ baffling capital struc-
tures also made fraud easier—or, as Ripley wrote in his distinctive style, 
increased the “temptation afforded to prestidigitation, double-shuffling, 
hornswoggling, and skullduggery.”185  As utilities in the 1920s moved 
aggressively to sell shares to their customers—Ripley estimating that 
1,307,000 customers of utilities were now also shareholders—their fi-
nancial shenanigans not only threatened the public generally but also 
endangered shareholders with particular force.186  Yet for all his con-
cerns, Ripley’s proposed solution was, as had been the case in the pre-
vious articles, mild.  While he implied that national regulation of utilities 
would be appropriate, all he called for in his article was a comprehensive 
study of the utilities by the National Power Commission.187 
Though each of Ripley’s articles garnered public attention, his cru-
sade for better corporate governance appeared to be building towards the 
publication of a book collecting and expanding upon his articles.  Main 
Street and Wall Street was published in February 1927.  It is a book that 
raises “what-ifs,” for while the book proved a best-seller, Ripley was not 
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able to use it as a springboard to further attacks on corporate ills.  A 
month before its publication in January 1927, Ripley was riding in a tax-
icab to give a speech to the annual meeting of the American Bar Associa-
tion in New York City when his cab was struck by a drunk driver.188  He 
suffered a severe head injury in the crash and, shortly thereafter, a nerv-
ous breakdown.189  At precisely the moment when American capitalism 
entered its frenzied phase and his book was gaining high praise, Ripley 
was removed from the scene.  He was out of the public spotlight for 
more than two years.  While accounts of Ripley dot newspapers through-
out 1926, further reports of his activities do not appear again until the 
end of 1929 when he was finally well enough to resume teaching at Har-
vard.190 
Main Street and Wall Street appeared to great acclaim.191  The “un-
derlying thought” in the work, Ripley acknowledged, was hardly new; 
his intellectual forebears included Brandeis, Lippmann, and Woodrow 
Wilson, each of whom had identified the separation of ownership and 
control of corporate property.192  But, Ripley continued, the problem had 
been fundamentally changed, and made newly important, by “the great 
increase in popular investment in business and other corporations.”193  It 
was the “transformation of hitherto purely personal businesses, closely 
owned, into very widely held and loosely governed public enterpris-
es . . . which brings the problem of corporate organization and govern-
ment into such peculiar prominence at this time.”194 
For the most part the work gathered up and expanded on Ripley’s 
three articles from the Atlantic, with a few additions.  The first chapter 
was not by Ripley at all, but an address given by Woodrow Wilson in 
1910 which drove home both Ripley’s general themes about managerial 
power and, in particular, his contention that the corporation had changed 
the nature of a shareholder’s property.  As Wilson noted, the minority 
shareholder of a corporation “does not seem to enjoy any of the substan-
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tial rights of property in connection” with his stocks.195  Also, two later 
chapters dealing with railroad reorganization were completely new.196 
Main Street and Wall Street’s main points would have been familiar 
to readers of the Atlantic pieces: corporations were fast-growing and 
supplanting other business forms; managers were whittling away at the 
remnants of shareholder power; power over corporate property had been 
separated from its ownership; and wider dispersion of ownership and the 
new retail shareholder only accelerated the shift in power.  Once more, 
Ripley linked all these developments to two fundamental changes, “the 
progressive diffusion of ownership on the one hand and of the ever-
increasing concentration of managerial power on the other.”197 
One shift in emphasis between the Atlantic articles and the book 
might have been noticed by astute readers: the book paid new attention to 
recent changes in corporation law that had allowed “the steady en-
croachment of management on shareholder rights.”198  Those already 
familiar with Ripley’s attack on nonvoting stock were introduced to addi-
tional legal changes, which, Ripley asserted, undermined shareholder 
power.  They learned how state competition for corporate charters en-
couraged managerial power and impeded state-level regulation,199 of the 
growing use of no-par stock, which Ripley believed would destroy a 
shareholder’s ability to evaluate the finances of his firm,200 and of grants 
of indemnity in corporate charters intended to shield managers from any 
liability for errors or conflicts of interest.201 
In providing a brief summary of legal developments, this section of 
Main Street and Wall Street presages the much more thorough account 
given several years later in Berle and Means’s The Modern Corporation 
and Private Property.  This is unsurprising, as by 1927 Ripley had be-
come a friend and patron of Adolf A. Berle, Jr.  Berle had actually been a 
student of Ripley’s at Harvard College—as had many others, including 
Franklin Roosevelt—but they renewed their acquaintance in 1925 when 
Berle, then a successful corporation lawyer, began teaching a class on 
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corporation finance at the Harvard Business School.202  Berle’s writings 
in the 1920s examined the various ways that corporation law was chang-
ing to disempower shareholders.  While his name does not appear in the 
Atlantic articles, Berle’s name and ideas show up half-a-dozen times in 
Main Street and Wall Street, usually in connection with the legal changes 
Ripley is attacking.203  By 1927, they were such good friends that when 
Ripley was injured on his way to give his speech to the ABA, Berle read 
the paper in his stead.204  As discussed below, it was through Berle’s 
friendship with Ripley that he secured a grant to begin his study of the 
modern corporation.205 
The interplay between Berle and Ripley also appears in a compari-
son of their work during the late 1920s.206  In Main Street and Wall 
Street, Ripley repeated his criticisms of corporate governance and sug-
gested solutions, but he also put forward a new proposal to mitigate the 
problems of corporate governance.  In the face of shareholder apathy and 
powerlessness, Ripley suggested that permanent committees be formed 
to represent shareholders’ interests and to serve as “independent checks 
or balances” on traditional corporate management.207  A year later, when 
Berle published his Studies in Corporation Finance, one of his main pro-
posals for protecting shareholders was for trust companies to hold stock 
on behalf of small shareholders and so garner a block of stock large 
enough to “represent the depositors of the stock . . . and, as representing 
their clients, [they] could take the action necessary to prevent or rectify 
violations of property rights.”208  Both men were searching for an institu-
tional intermediary that could defend small shareholders’ rights. 
When Main Street and Wall Street appeared, its reception ranged 
from positive to gushing and testified to how widely Ripley’s ideas had 
spread.  The distinguished corporate law scholar Henry Ballantine, writ-
ing in the California Law Review, was driven to poetry.  Discussing Rip-
ley’s impact on Wall Street, he wrote: 
A look of sadness, a blush of shame, 
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Over the faces of Wall Street came, 
A spirit of manhood within them stirred, 
To life at Ripley’s horrible words.209 
Other reviews also alluded to both the impact and the popularity of 
Ripley’s work, one writing that “no recent book dealing with economic 
subjects has received so much attention,” 210 another making much the 
same point, that “seldom, if ever, has the appearance of a book within the 
general field of applied economics, created such a stir in the American 
world of affairs. . . .”211  Yet this popularity did not detract from the 
weight reviewers gave the book; another called it the “most important 
book on the economic aspects of our day since . . . [Keynes’s] Economic 
Consequences of the Peace.”212 
In its review, The New York Times also sought to answer a puzzling 
question: Why did a campaign waged by this “bespectacled” Harvard 
economist gain so much attention?  Ripley did have access to the pages 
of the Atlantic, but that alone could not explain the controversy his ar-
ticles generated.  The Times credited Ripley’s success to his writing style 
and moral stance.  Although a distinguished scholar, Ripley’s criticisms 
were couched in the vernacular, and his “flippancies and colloquialisms” 
entertained readers.  At the same time—and in the same voice—Ripley 
managed to speak as a prophet: “he is first and last a moral crusader, 
hammering at the iniquities of his generation.”213  Not the least, he “men-
tions names and dates—a round score of corporations come in for scath-
ing denunciation.”214  The review nicely captures the attractions of Rip-
ley’s vivid writing style and of the outrage that permeates his work.  It 
also suggests one reason why Ripley’s critique was later forgotten: pitch-
ed at a broad audience, it lacks the heft of a scholarly work that would 
have dissected corporation law and finance.215 
For many readers, Main Street and Wall Street must have recalled 
the previous decades’ muckraking classics, but a few recognized that the 
work also marked a turning-point in popular understandings of corpora-
tion law and governance.  As noted above, while shareholder protection 
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has always been one element of corporation law, before the 1920s public 
discourse over corporations had focused on the corporation’s relationship 
to groups outside the corporation—customers, competitors, the general 
public—summed up in the term “the trust problem.”  In the 1920s, the 
spotlight had begun to shift to the corporation’s relationship to its share-
holders.216  Writing in the Nation, Stuart Chase took from Main Street 
and Wall Street that “the fat boys, no longer content with their ancient 
perquisite of milking the public, are now engaged in the dizzy and lofty 
job of squeezing their own shareholders dry!”217  In the American Jour-
nal of Sociology the political scientist Harold Lasswell also highlighted 
the shift: 
[Main Street and Wall Street] is a study in the corporation problem, 
which must be distinguished from the trust problem, about which so 
much was formerly written and about which so little is heard today.  
The welkin used to ring with complaints that big business gouged 
the consumer, and that monopolistic prices were squeezing the life 
out of the innocent public.  In this post-war world big business has 
somehow or other become a matter of course, and the controversies 
over it are conducted from the standpoint of the participant, not the 
outsider.  It is the little investor and not the little buyer who squeals 
for help.218 
Main Street and Wall Street was a popular and critical success.  It 
drove home the modern problems of corporate governance—the separa-
tion of ownership and control, dispersed share ownership, and the dan-
gers this posed for small shareholders—not only for a scholarly audience 
but also for a broad swath of American readers. 
D. Followers 
Ripley’s accident and nervous breakdown took him off the public 
stage for several years, yet the ideas he had propounded continued to be 
heard.  By the late 1920s it was almost a commonplace that ownership 
and control of corporations had separated, and that problems created by 
the separation were exacerbated by the dispersion of share ownership.219  
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In the years after Main Street and Wall Street, other authors would write 
popular works on the American corporation and the small shareholder, 
attempting to replicate Ripley’s popular success.  None enjoyed his rea-
dership, but their work demonstrates that Ripley’s ideas continued in the 
main current of American economics and culture.220 
In 1929, John H. Sears’s The New Place of the Stockholder was de-
scribed as another addition to the “long list of recent business books 
brought out in response to a popular demand, which seemed to grow 
along with public participation in the recent boom market.”221  Sears was 
an attorney with the Corporation Trust Company, but his book was 
aimed at a popular audience.  It opened with a folksy “Prologue” in 
which two stereotyped Irishmen discussed the modern corporation.222  In 
this exchange, readers are told that, while problems in corporations exist, 
they are rapidly learning to heed the voice of their shareholders, with one 
speaker telling his friend that, “Me son tells me that invistors is getting’ 
informed of their rights” [sic].223  Sears was not a complete apologist for 
the status quo; he acknowledged some problems caused by dispersed 
shareholding and advocated increased voluntary disclosure by public 
corporations, including an annual “lawyers’ audit” of its activities.  But 
the chief problem he identified was just that corporate management had 
not done enough to make small shareholders feel welcomed by the cor-
poration.  His overall approach can be summed up by his statement that, 
“I don’t think Main Street has any right to criticize Wall Street in matters 
of corporate finance.”224 
Frankenstein, Incorporated took the opposite tack.  It was written 
by a respected New York corporation lawyer and professor at Fordham 
Law School, Maurice Wormser.225  As the title suggests, Wormser was a 
sharper critic of the corporation than Ripley, but his book echoes Main 
Street and Wall Street.  The book locates many “glaring abuses” in the 
“transformation of small, closely held, personal business corpora-
                                                                                                                                     
decision.  See Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Baldridge, 278 U.S. 105, 114 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting) 
(“A standing criticism of the use of corporations in business is that it causes such business to be 
owned by people who do not know anything about it. Argument has not been supposed to be neces-
sary in order to show that the divorce between the power of control and knowledge is an evil.”). 
 220. As noted above, it also had its predecessors in Carver’s Economic Revolution and Brook-
ing’s work.  See supra text accompanying notes 99–100. 
 221. Robert L. Masson, Book Review, 5 THE ACCOUNTING REVIEW 324 (1930) (reviewing The 
New Place of the Stockholder). 
 222. See Sears, supra note 219, at xiii.  This was Sears’s attempt to emulate the ethnic humor 
of Peter Finley Dunne’s popular “Mr. Dooley.” 
 223. Id. 
 224. Id. at 6. 
 225. See I. MAURICE WORMSER, FRANKENSTEIN, INCORPORATED (F.B. Rothman 1981) 
(1931). 
1286 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 33:4 
tions . . . into nationwide companies whose stock is widely held in many 
dispersed hands and which too often are characterized by loose, careless 
management and control.”226  Many of his targets were also the same; 
“chartermongering” states, nonvoting stock, and holding companies all 
came in for criticism.  However, the solutions he proposes are more am-
bitious than Ripley’s.  In particular, Wormser advocated a uniform na-
tional corporation law.  Fundamentally, though, Wormser followed Rip-
ley in attacking the “tendency to corporate control by a small 
group[,] . . . [which] has given rise to a reign of corporate oligarchy. . . .  
The shareholders have become an empty cipher.”227 
Both The New Place of the Stockholder and Frankenstein, Incorpo-
rated recalled Ripley’s work.  Both focused on the separation of owner-
ship and control and dispersed shareholding, and both spent time on the 
legal mechanisms by which management could overpower shareholders.  
But they, and indeed Main Street and Wall Street, would ultimately be 
eclipsed by another successor, Berle and Means’s The Modern Corpora-
tion and Private Property.    
IV.  FROM MAIN STREET TO THE MODERN CORPORATION 
After its publication in 1932, The Modern Corporation and Private 
Property would set the agenda for corporation law for the rest of the cen-
tury, establishing the separation of ownership and control as the central 
issue of modern corporate governance.  Its introduction, however, closed 
with an acknowledgment that it was not the first work to tackle these is-
sues: “all students of these and allied problems, and we among them, 
owe a debt to Professor William Z. Ripley . . . who must be recognized 
as having pioneered this area.”228  The Modern Corporation was no 
knockoff of Main Street and Wall Street—indeed, as discussed below, its 
departures from the 1920s critiques were as significant as its resemblance 
to them—but the later book clearly followed in Ripley’s wake. 
The Modern Corporation owed its origins to Ripley.  In 1927, with 
Ripley’s support, Berle received a grant from the Laura Spellman Rock-
efeller Foundation to begin a study of the modern corporation that would 
eventually become The Modern Corporation and Private Property.229  
When the foundation insisted that Berle collaborate with an economist in 
the study, he chose an old friend, Gardiner Means.  Means was by then a 
graduate student in economics at Columbia, but he began his graduate 
career at Harvard, where he had taken Ripley’s course on the corporation 
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and industry.230  Ripley’s support of Berle and of his project continued 
over the next few years.  When Berle’s casebook on Corporation Finance 
appeared in 1931, Ripley reviewed it for the Columbia Law Review, de-
scribing it not only as a landmark contribution to jurisprudence and busi-
ness practice but also as a companion to Main Street and Wall Street.231  
In fact, another reviewer of the casebook described it as just “an able and 
brilliant footnote” to Main Street and Wall Street.232 
The Modern Corporation and Private Property appeared in late 
1932.  The story of its publication and success is fairly well-known.  The 
book was initially scheduled to be published by the Corporation Clearing 
House, a law publisher and subsidiary of the Corporation Trust Compa-
ny, but shortly after publication, a client of the Trust Company read a 
review and demanded that the publisher pull the book.233  The book was 
picked up by Macmillan, whose clout brought The Modern Corporation 
“much wider distribution and review.”234  Glowing reviews helped it 
along.  In the New York Herald Tribune, the historian Charles Beard 
called the work perhaps the most “significant work of American state-
craft” since the Federalist Papers,235 while in the New Republic Stuart 
Chase called it “epoch-shattering.”236  It sold well and was hailed as a 
classic.237 
In its outlines, the story of the work’s success is no doubt correct.  
But that success is still puzzling.  The Modern Corporation and Private 
Property is not an easy book.  As more than one critic has noted, it is a 
work of parts that do not always hang together, with daunting statistical 
sections and long disquisitions on arcane areas of corporation law shar-
ing space with portentous speculations about the evolution of American 
society and economics.  “Except for corporate lawyers who happened to 
have a way with statistics, few readers could have understood all of the 
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book.”238  Macmillan’s promotional reach alone cannot explain the 
book’s success nor can its timing.  The Modern Corporation was certain-
ly not the only book published during the 1930s seeking to explain eco-
nomic changes, and unlike some of its competitors, The Modern Corpo-
ration barely addressed the Great Depression.239 
Why then was it so quickly and rapturously welcomed?  Some cre-
dit must go to the work of Ripley and to other corporate critics of the 
1920s.  The Modern Corporation and Private Property had the welcome 
quality of being, at least at first glance, a new variation on themes popu-
larized by the earlier authors.  Reviewer after reviewer noted that The 
Modern Corporation fit into a familiar genre.  A reviewer in the Cornell 
Law Quarterly called The Modern Corporation a “further, more detailed, 
and up-to-date study” of the problem examined by Ripley in Main Street 
and Wall Street, while also mentioning earlier works by Veblen and John 
Sears. 240  The Yale Law Journal described The Modern Corporation as 
the latest in a “series of books [that] in recent years has discerned the 
widening gap between the legal theory of the corporation and its use or 
abuse in business practice,” a series that included Carver’s Present Eco-
nomic Revolution and Wormser’s Frankenstein Incorporated, as well as 
Main Street and Wall Street. 241  Other reviewers also noted the similarity 
between Berle and Means’s and Ripley’s work, not the least being Ripley 
himself, who wrote a generous review of The Modern Corporation in the 
New York Times shortly before its publication.  He stated that, while he 
had “brushed over . . . lightly” the issues raised by their work in Main 
Street and Wall Street, The Modern Corporation provided “a more sub-
stantial appraisal of . . . the whole business.”242 
What was old and what was new in The Modern Corporation?  
Many of its ideas and themes had been circulating for a decade, not only 
in academic circles but also, thanks chiefly to Ripley’s work, in broader 
public discourse.  Readers had learned in magazines and books that own-
ership had separated from control in giant corporations, that this was ac-
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celerated by the growth of small stockholders, and that these develop-
ments posed deep problems for the legitimacy and governance of the 
modern corporation.  They were familiar as well with a corporate critique 
that focused not on the corporation’s threat to consumers, workers, com-
petitors, or the general public, but on the threat that untrammeled man-
agement posed shareholders.243  They had even been introduced to the 
notion that shares were a new kind of property.244  Were this the sum of 
The Modern Corporation and Private Property, Berle and Means would 
not have been saying much new; but, of course, it was not. 
The Modern Corporation and Private Property was not only a 
product of the 1920s critiques; it was also a transcendence of them.  
Berle and Means began with the materials developed in the 1920s but 
expanded upon them and fit them within an overarching framework ab-
sent from the earlier works.  Main Street and Wall Street had been a 
work of journalism and advocacy, more jeremiad than treatise.  The 
Modern Corporation had its advocacy, but it was, in addition, a com-
manding work of scholarship, partnering daunting empirical and statis-
tical data with a dense discussion of recent developments in corporation 
law.  In both appearance and fact, The Modern Corporation had a weight 
that Main Street and Wall Street lacked.  Where Ripley and his epigones 
had sketched out the growth of shareholding, Gardiner Means surveyed 
major firms to provide fine-grained and systematic information about 
small shareholdings at the nation’s largest corporations.245  Where Ripley 
pointed to nonvoting stock as a culprit for management’s disconnect 
from shareholders and in his book drew on Berle’s articles to sketch out 
other pernicious legal developments, Berle spent almost one hundred 
pages of The Modern Corporation providing a detailed synopsis of legal 
changes that had over decades disempowered shareholders.246 
Berle and Means also developed concepts absent from the 1920s 
debates, perhaps a sign of the distance between 1927 and 1932.  One of 
these was the idea of “control” as a separate category from ownership 
and management, an idea one careful critic has labeled a “profound and 
original insight, perhaps the salient long-term contribution” of The Mod-
ern Corporation.247  For Berle and Means, control of a giant corporation 
was the ability to name its directors—and, therefore, to set its course—
and it could be wielded by a majority shareholder, by minority share-
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holders if ownership were sufficiently dispersed, or by management if 
there were no powerful minority shareholders.248  Another innovation 
was a product of Berle’s legal writings.  Whereas during the 1920s Rip-
ley, and indeed Berle, had looked to shareholders to develop their own 
mechanisms to tame corporate managers, perhaps with a nudge from the 
FTC, by the early 1930s, Berle had begun to demand judicial protection 
for shareholders.  Hence, Berle insisted in The Modern Corporation that 
corporate managers’ powers are “powers in trust,” subject to judicial 
oversight in the same manner as are trustees’ powers.249  No longer was a 
shareholder’s protection to be found only within the corporation; it was 
also to be found in the courtroom. 
Berle and Means’s most striking innovation, however, was to 
embed their story of the separation of ownership and control and dis-
persed ownership within a larger historical narrative.  The Modern Cor-
poration and Private Property came with its own teleology.  Relying on 
Means’s study of growing corporate concentration, they claimed to have 
discerned a process whereby the nation’s largest corporations absorbed 
more and more of America’s assets.  This was not merely an observation 
that corporations were getting larger.  Within the corporate system, Berle 
and Means asserted, there was a “centripetal attraction, which draws 
wealth together into aggregations of constantly increasing size.”250  Al-
ready, as the authors showed, the two hundred largest U.S. nonbank cor-
porations controlled half the nation’s corporate wealth, and if their 
growth continued, as the authors expected it would, those two hundred 
corporations would conduct seventy percent of all corporate activity by 
mid-century.251 
The continued growth of the modern corporation and its accrual of 
economic and political power was for Berle and Means the central fact of 
modern life, rendering the corporation an organization with an impact 
comparable to the medieval church or the modern state.252  They agreed 
with earlier writers who noted that the corporation had changed the na-
ture of property, but they extrapolated from this the need not to reestab-
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lish shareholder power over the corporation but to rethink “the ends for 
which the modern corporation can or will be run.”253  The corporate cri-
tiques of the 1920s tended to close with a call to tame corporate man-
agement.  The Modern Corporation closed with a more prophetic vi-
sion—one of the end of private enterprise, the abandonment of the profit 
motive, and the transformation of corporate control from a selfish clique 
into a “purely neutral technocracy, balancing a variety of claims by vari-
ous groups in the community and assigning to each a portion of the in-
come stream on the basis of public policy rather than private cupidity.”254 
In sum, two elements decisively set The Modern Corporation and 
Private Property apart from its predecessors.  First was the weight and 
thoroughness of its scholarly apparatus.  Whereas earlier authors identi-
fied the separation of ownership and control and dispersed shareholding 
as creating deep problems of corporate governance, Berle and Means 
documented both phenomena in a way never attempted previously.  
Second, they bound up their conclusions in a grand narrative, one which 
portrayed the split of ownership and control and the spread of sharehold-
ing not as ordinary problems to be solved but as elements of a fundamen-
tal transformation of American society and of capitalism itself. 255 
CONCLUSION 
Scholars and historians date the origins of modern corporate gover-
nance to the 1932 publication of Adolf A. Berle & Gardiner Means’s The 
Modern Corporation and Private Property.  This Article argues that 
conclusion is wrong.  Well before the publication of The Modern Corpo-
ration the separation of ownership and control, dispersed shareholding 
and the problems attendant on them were topics of intellectual analysis 
and, more surprising, public debate.  The intellectual roots of these ideas 
stretch back at least to the 1890s, and authors including Louis Brandeis, 
Walter Lippmann, and Thorsten Veblen grappled with them before 
World War I.  In the 1920s, the separation of ownership and control and 
consequent questions of corporate governance became matters for public 
debate, thanks largely to the work of Harvard economist William Z. Rip-
ley, who popularized them in a public crusade against corporate man-
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agement that culminated in his 1927 work Main Street and Wall Street.  
Due to Ripley and others, by the 1920s the orientation of corporation law 
was already shifting from concern over corporations’ power over outsid-
ers such as consumers and competitors, to worries about the distribution 
of power within the corporation, as shareholder protection became a cen-
tral concern for corporate law and theory. 
This conclusion does not denigrate from The Modern Corporation 
and Private Property’s real achievements; instead, it helps better explain 
them.  The Modern Corporation and Private Property was quickly hailed 
as a classic due to the fact that it was both startling and familiar.  Its 
grand prophecies about the transformation of capitalism were startling, 
yet those prophecies rested on conclusions about corporate evolution and 
governance that had been spread widely in the decades before its publi-
cation.  It was because The Modern Corporation was a continuation of 
trends in American thought, the latest in a series of works on the separa-
tion of ownership and control, dispersed shareholding, and corporate go-
vernance, that its more radical conclusions won a hearing.  Only with the 
passage of time and with the fading of memories of William Z. Ripley 
and other writers, did Berle and Means come to be seen as the discover-
ers of the separation of ownership and control and The Modern Corpora-
tion as the originating document of modern corporate governance. 
 
